Preparing for a post-Assad Syria: What role for the European Union?  CEPS Commentary, 2 August 2012 by Blockmans, Steve
 
 
Steven Blockmans is a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the EU Foreign Policy Unit at CEPS. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2012 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ http://www.ceps.eu 
Preparing for a post-Assad Syria: 
What role for the European Union? 
Steven Blockmans 
2 August 2012 
 
he summer in Syria is particularly hot and dry this year. As the battle for Aleppo is 
raging, already 200,000 people have fled Syria’s second biggest city. Estimates of the 
total  number  of  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  currently  hover  at  around  1 
million. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent has reported that the food and shelter needs of these 
people are becoming a real concern. The UN refugee agency has registered around 125,000 
individuals  who  have sought  refuge  in  Turkey,  Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Iraq.  Based  on  the 
average  daily  new  arrivals  in  neighbouring  countries,  this  figure  could  rise  to  200,000 
refugees  by  the  end  of  2012.  International  organisations  and  agencies,  neighbouring 
countries  and  other  states  are  trying  to  alleviate  some  of  the  stress  of  the  unfolding 
humanitarian disaster.  
The  EU  too  is  engaging  in  relief  efforts.  So  far,  it  has  given  more  than  €90  million  in 
humanitarian assistance (€63 million from the European Commission and more than €27 
million from member states). It continues to call for unhindered access for humanitarian 
organisations to assess the needs of the civilian population and to provide humanitarian and 
medical aid where needed. 
Apart  from  the  displaced,  wounded  and  the  sick,  the  death  toll  keeps  rising.  In  the  16 
months since the government of President Bashar al-Assad began its violent repression of the 
uprising, 18,000 Syrians are estimated to have died. The EU has been calling for a process of 
transitional  justice.  It  has  commended  the  work  of  the  Independent  International 
Commission of Inquiry on Syria and its investigations into alleged violations of international 
human rights law with a view to holding accountable those responsible for such violations, 
including those that may amount to crimes against humanity.  
The  violent  implosion  of  Syria  has  underscored  the  deterioration  of  the  strategic 
environment in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. For years, Syria and Lebanon have 
been sites of strategic competition between Iran and Turkey. Since President Assad’s father 
staged a coup in 1970, the minority group of Alawites has dominated the Syrian government 
and controlled 80% of the positions in the powerful Republican Guard. The Alawites are a 
heterodox Muslim sect related to a Shiite offshoot that makes up about 12% of the country’s 
population,  which  is  overwhelmingly  Sunni.  The  Iranian  Islamist  regime  has  given  the 
Syrian regime its support in the decades-long suppression of Syria’s Sunni majority. Tehran, 
whose main instrument in Syria and Lebanon is the radical Shiite force Hezbollah, also gave 
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Syria support in its adventures in Lebanon. As the current crisis in Syria deepens, Iran has 
been  reported  to  have  warned  Turkey  not  to  intervene  militarily  or  risk  activating  the 
Iranian-Syrian mutual defence agreement and thus meeting with a harsh response. 
In  the  last  decade,  Turkey  has  been  investing heavily  in  Syria.  Ankara  believed  that  by 
engaging with the secular regime in Damascus, it could lure Syria (and Lebanon by proxy) 
away from its close alliance with Iran. Also, Turkey tried to broker a peace deal between 
Syria  and  Israel  but  negotiations  collapsed  after  Israel  invaded  Gaza.  The  subsequent 
inability of Turkey to overcome the hostile fallout from the Mavi Marmara incident with 
Israel, has led to a dramatic worsening of Turkish-Israeli relations. At the same time, Turkey 
has a keen interest in averting an Israeli military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
After months of futile attempts to convince President Assad to begin a transition to a more 
open and democratic system, Turkey unequivocally called for his departure. It unilaterally 
slapped sanctions upon the regime and has firmly sided with the Syrian opposition, whose 
representative organisation, the Syrian National Council, it hosts. Turkey has also allowed 
the Free Syrian Army to set up camp on its side of the 900-kilometre-long border with Syria 
and,  like  Saudi  Arabia  and  Qatar,  has  propped  it  up  with  financial  support.  However, 
Turkey is unlikely to intervene unilaterally, especially in view of the deadlock in the UN 
Security Council over the issue. 
Together with China, Russia has blocked three different attempts by the US and its EU allies 
to  impose  sanctions  on  Syria  under  the  heading  of  Chapter  VII  of  the  United  Nations 
Charter. For fear of being embroiled in another protracted and bloody conflict with wider 
geopolitical ramifications, there is no appetite in the West for a military intervention in Syria. 
Instead, the US and the EU are waging an economic war on the Assad regime. 
For its part, the EU has cranked up the pressure on Assad and his cronies by adopting a 
comprehensive package of restrictive measures. In 17 rounds of tightening sanctions, the 
package now includes: 
  an embargo on exporting arms and equipment for internal repression to Syria 
(accompanied by an obligation for EU countries to inspect vessels and aircraft 
heading to Syria if they suspect the cargo contains arms or equipment for internal 
repression, and an obligation to seize such items if they are found); 
  a ban on exports of key equipment and technology to the Syrian oil and gas sectors;  
  a ban on participation in the construction of new power plants in Syria;  
  a ban on exports of equipment and software intended for use in the monitoring of 
internet and telephone communications by the Syrian regime;  
  a ban on providing grants, loans, export credit insurance, technical assistance, 
insurance and reinsurance for exports of arms and of equipment for internal 
repression to Syria;  
  a ban on trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and 
the central bank;  
  a freeze on 52 entities’ assets held within the EU, including the Syrian central bank, 
while ensuring that legitimate trade can continue under strict conditions;  
  an asset freeze and a visa ban on 155 persons associated with the regime and/or 
responsible for violent repression or human rights abuses; and 
  a prohibition on access to EU airports for cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers, 
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Money is the main reason to believe that the Assad regime cannot last. Inflation is reported 
to be as high as 30%; the regime is said to be freely printing money; the Syrian pound has 
depreciated against the dollar by more than half on the black market. Meanwhile, the regime 
is running out of foreign cash. Some 90% of Syria’s oil used to go to the EU but sanctions 
have now put a stop to that. Trade has plummeted. Monetary support from Iran cannot be 
counted on indefinitely as Iran itself is buckling under unprecedented sanctions from the EU 
and the US. 
But for all the pressure applied by the West, the effects thereof are partly undone by Russia, 
which continues to provide cover to the besieged Assad regime and is asserting its influence 
through arms sales and a naval presence in support of the regime. 
A tipping point in the conflict was reached with the opposition’s successful attack on the 
national security building in Damascus on July 18th, which killed the Minister of Defence, 
the deputy Defence Minister (a brother-in-law of Assad), a deputy Vice-President (Assad’s 
chief  of  crisis  management)  and  the  director  of  the  National  Security  Bureau,  i.e.  the 
architects of the regime’s violent repression. The attack, which struck at the heart of the 
regime’s  power-base,  has  helped  to  boost  the  morale  of  the  opposition  forces  and  has 
consolidated  the  belief  in  the  West that the  fall  of  the  dictator  is  inevitable.  The  various 
political opposition groups are finally coming together to plan for a post-Assad Syria. Now 
that, besides scores of pilots, ambassadors and colonels, a top Sunni general (who for 30 
years served as a Minister of Defence under President Hafez al-Assad) has also defected, it 
has dawned even on Moscow that Assad’s days are numbered. If the increasing number of 
top-level  defections  is  a  signal  that  the  Sunni  elite,  which  is  comprised  of  generals, 
businessmen and bureaucrats who have so far stuck with Assad, is now moving away from 
the President, then that represents a huge shift; one that will ultimately bring down the 
regime. 
The  regime  has  reacted  angrily  to  the  bomb-attack  on  the  national  security  building  by 
launching what may turn out to be a make-or-break offensive to regain control over parts of 
Damascus  and  other  big  cities  that  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  ever-stronger  and  better 
organised opposition forces. 
The most troubling scenario for the region, as indeed the world, may also be the most likely 
one: protracted  chaos  and  sectarian  violence  in  Syria,  leaving  a security  vacuum  and  an 
opportunity for terrorist organisations like Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda to harvest the country’s 
weapons of mass destruction, in particular the large stockpiles of chemical weapons, with an 
on-going  risk  of  spill-over  effects  affecting  the  security  and  stability  of  neighbouring 
countries. A prolonged period of great uncertainty, with regional and global powers trying 
to preserve their own interests in Syria, underlines the limits of unilateralism.  
The  EU  should  now  actively  plan  for  a  post-Assad  Syria.  Arguably,  these  plans  should 
extend  beyond  the  European  Union’s  measured  lifting  of  sanctions  and  half-hearted 
responses  to  the  monumental  changes  that  have  ripped  through  other parts  of  the Arab 
world.  The  conditioned  levels  of  financial  support  and  the  speed  with  which  trade 
liberalisation and mobility of people can be achieved under the European Neighbourhood 
Policy’s revised approach are simply not enough to rebuild the country’s bombed-out towns 
and cities, to create a rule of law-based democracy, and to turn the potentially vicious circle 
into a virtuous one. What is needed in terms of peace-building in Syria is the extension of 
Marshall-like aid which goes beyond the EU’s current means and capacities. 
Together with its partners, the EU must review and recalibrate its policies towards Syria, as 
indeed the entire region. After all, the EU cannot pursue an effective humanitarian, political, 
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interests of Syria’s neighbouring countries. In recognition of the geostrategic shifts in the 
Middle East and the Gulf, and pursuant to the constitutional obligation imposed upon the 
European Union by way of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8 TEU),1 the EU should plan for the 
creation of a regional space of shared security. 
Given the zero-sum security metrics in the region, and to a certain extent at global level, a 
common  security  framework  that  commits  all  relevant  actors,  takes  everyone’s  security 
needs into account, and thus diminishes the mistrust that fuels proliferation, would be a 
huge step forward. Arguably, the EU is better placed to launch such an initiative than the 
US, Russia or China. The EU has maintained day-to-day exchanges with all countries in the 
region, including Iran since the Islamic revolution. It is leading the E3+3 talks with Iran on 
nuclear  non-proliferation,  is  currently  steering  the  Quartet’s  efforts  in  the  Middle  East 
Process and has strategic relations with Turkey. The EU could inspire the countries in the 
region  by  using  the  historical  experience  of  its  own  creation.  It  would  be  up  to  High 
Representative Catherine Ashton, supported by the European External Action Service, and 
in cooperation with the member states and the European Commission, to draw up a plan 
that revives the idea of a security zone for the wider Middle East. Such a plan would fit well 
into the current efforts to revamp the European Security Strategy. 
                                                   
1 Paragraph 1 reads: “The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, 
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the 
Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” 